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The freedom to profess and practice religion is one of the basic rights in Malaysia that 
often catalysis legal issues and discussions. The provision in Article 11 of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia generally guarantees the said right to a person to practice his 
religion of choice; however, Muslims or practitioners of Islam are not as free as the non-
Muslims in the matter of their conversion or reconversion to another religion. This article 
focuses on the actions or process for a Muslim’s conversion to other religion and the legal 
ramifications of such actions. This discussion identifies several actions of apostasy, such 
as issuing a declaration of conversion via a Deed Poll, requesting a Muslim name to be 
changed to a non-Muslim’s, and renouncing Islam altogether and reverting to a previously 
held religion (reconversion). There are legal implications for these said actions, such as 
fines and detention at Aqidah Rehabilitation Centres, which clearly shows that the 
freedom to practice religion or conversion to other religions as found in Article 11 of the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia applies to non-Muslims only. In cases relating to 
determination of the status of Islam as a religion, the Shariah Court have been given 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear those cases, as mentioned in the amendment to Article 
121(1A) of the Federal Constitution. 
 




Freedom of religion is enshrined in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
Keeping this in mind, however, Islam is the official religion of Malaysia and must be 
respected as such; thus, there are consequently a number of legal restrictions upon 
non-Muslims that prohibit them from proselytizing to Muslims in Malaysia. Despite 
this, there are also Muslims in Malaysia that have attempted to convert to other 
religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity. These Muslims use variety 
of means and ways to demonstrate their apostasy – by intention, verbal, and physical 
methods. However, no matter what action is been taken, it does not and will not result 
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in any legal consequences, i.e. that person will still be presumed to be a Muslim for 
as long as his actions of apostasy are not confirmed and declared by any Shariah 
Courts in Malaysia. The Shariah Court’s jurisdiction has been recognized by 
Malaysian legal bodies in hearing cases of Muslim apostasies in Malaysia. Such 
cases, especially those determined after the amendment of Article 121(1A) of the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia, clearly shows exclusive recognition given to the 
Shariah Courts in deciding a Muslims’ religious status (if his status as a Muslim is 
doubted). Although state enactments only provide that the Shariah Courts’ 
jurisdiction apply to the confirmation of one’s status as a Muslim, cases of apostasy 
from Islam also fall under these courts’ jurisdiction based on legal implication. There 
are a number of legal implications if an act of apostasy from Islam, regardless of 
whether it is confirm or not, is presented to the Shariah Courts. If the action is 
successfully proven in a Shariah Court, the respective state enactments provide for a 
variety of sentences for the offender in the form of detention and fines. In contrast, if 
an attempt of apostasy is not brought before the Shariah Court for confirmation, the 
would-be apostate will continue to be a Muslim, and is therefore legally bound to 
Islamic law. Furthermore, his identity as a Muslim in his identification card will also 
remain because before he can have that status removed at the National Registration 
Department, the NRD must first acquire confirmation to do so by the relevant 
authority – which, in this case, is the Shariah Court.  
Based on the statement above, the question thus arises: does the freedom of 
religion guaranteed in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia applies to 
Muslims as it does to non-Muslims in Malaysia? If the said freedom is to be construed 
as also applicable to Muslims, what then is the need for Article 11(4) that grants 
jurisdiction to state governments to have enactments that control proselytization of 
other religions among Muslims in Malaysia? Moreover, what then would be the 
justification for the provisions in the various states’ Shariah Criminal Enactments 
that have sentences to punish apostates from Islam? Last but not least, why should 
an act of apostasy from Islam be confirmed in a Shariah Court, since if it is indeed 
an act performed under the guarantee of freedom of religion, there should therefore 
be no need for such confirmation. These questions must be subjected to legal 
explanation in order to clarify the difference between freedom of religion for 
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Muslims and freedom of religion for non-Muslims in Malaysia. This article will 
attempt to provide the required explanation for the above mentioned issues by 
discussing the concept of freedom of religion, the practice of apostasy in Malaysia, 
the jurisdiction of the Shariah Courts in deciding cases of apostasy, and the legal 
implications of becoming an apostate of Islam.  
B. RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN MALAYSIA 
Religions in Malaysia are generally categorized as follows: Islam and “not 
Islam” (other religions). The definition of the religion of Islam itself was given by 
the (then) Supreme Court Judge, Tun Salleh Abas in the case of Che Omar Bin Che 
Soh ((1988) 2 Malayan Law Journal, 56, where he defined it as a syumul 
(comprehensive) way of life that encompasses all aspects of life, be it private or 
public, legal, political, economic, social, cultural, moral or judicial. According to 
Section 2 of the Selangor Non-Islamic Religions (Control of Propagation Amongst 
Muslims) Enactment 1988, religions ‘other than Islam’ means Christianity, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Judaism or any variation or form or branch of the 
aforementioned religions, and includes any belief, ideology, philosophy, group, or 
practical system; 
1. Whereby one of the characteristics (of that religion) is the worship of a particular 
existence or spiritual power or magic, whether real or presumed to be real; or  
2. That which admits its purpose or one of its objectives is the attainment of 
spiritual enlightenment or spiritual presence, i.e. a belief, philosophy, ideology 
or group or practical system that is not acknowledged in Islam as possessing 
Islamic elements. 
Based on the above legal provision, it is understood that the rights to freedom 
of certain groups of people to take control of his religious affairs shall be put on trial 
in the event that the court agrees that the matter being addressed in the court falls into 
the definition of religion, as intended by the Constitution.  
The right to freedom of religion is included as one of the categories of basic 
rights specifically provided for in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution. A more 
general view on freedom of religion can be seen by reading Article 3(1) with Articles 
10, 8 and 12 of the Federal Constitution. Article 11 states that the right of an 
individual to profess, practice and propagate his religion is subject to general laws 
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concerning public order, safety, health and morals. Article 11(4) on the other hand 
states the authority of the state governments and Federal Territory to control and 
prevent the proliferation of religions other than Islam among Muslims. On the 
Federal level, the rights to freedom of religion are overseen and controlled by the 
National Harmony Act 2013, Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (Act 736), Printing 
Presses and Publications Act 1984 (Amendment), Societies Act 1966, and the Penal 
Code. Furthermore, by virtue of the state Islamic Affairs Administrative Enactments, 
state governments are granted the power to control any sort of Muslim religious 
activity, specified under the Shariah Administrative Enactment and the Shariah 
Criminal Offences Enactment. For example Section 14(1) of the Shariah Criminal 
Enactment (Selangor) 1995, states that the state government via the Islamic Religious 
Council has the power to give credential to an individual to teach Islam among 
Muslims who are not his family members. If such person teaches Islam to members 
of the general public without the necessary credential from the Religious Council and 
is found guilty of doing so, he may be fined up to not more than three thousand ringgit 
or imprisoned for not more than two years or both.  Section 97 of the Administration 
of Islamic Religious Affairs (State of Selangor) Enactment2003 states that Friday 
prayers are also not allowed to be offered in any place which has not received 
permission in writing from the State Islamic Religious Council.  
Article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution states that Islam is the religion of the 
Federation, but other religions may be practiced peacefully in any part of the 
Federation. This provision explains the acknowledgment of Islam as the official 
religion of the Federation while also considering the rights of people of other faiths 
to practice their respective religions in peace and harmony. This is further proven by 
the provision of Article 11(2) (3) of the Federal Constitution that gives freedom to 
all religious groups to maintain their respective religious affairs, institutions and 
property for the purpose of their religion and its welfare. They also cannot be forced 
to pay any form of taxation if the income from such tax, whether as a whole or in 
part, is specifically intended for a religion other than the one they profess. The 
guarantee to the right of freedom of religion is evidenced by the existence of a 
provision regarding emergency in Article 150(6A), which prevents the powers of 
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Parliament from being expanded, even during a state of emergency, to matters 
relating to religion.  
Article 10 (1) concerns the rights to freedom of speech, freedom to assemble 
and freedom to form societies, all of which are subject to clauses (2), (3) and (4). 
Freedom of speech in the Constitution is limited to speech that is not accusatory, 
seditious, does not encourage criminal acts or propagate political instability, does not 
attack the dignity of the courts, or violate the rights of Parliament and the State 
Senate. In the context of freedom of religion, any kind of celebration, lecture or 
written material, including those of a religious nature, falls under the purview of the 
Home Ministry. The freedom of assembly provided in Article 10(1) (b) is subject to 
Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (Act 736), which states that all processions, assemblies 
or meetings can only be held if they have obtained the necessary permit or license to 
do so from the police beforehand, and that the police have the authority to abstain 
from issuing the said permit or license if the procession, assembly or meeting in 
question is thought to pose a threat to the nation’s security. Therefore, any form of 
assembly, even those that are religious in nature and formed with the intention of 
discussing religious matters, whether held in a public place or a mosque or a prayer 
room, will only be approved after the necessary permission has been obtained from 
the relevant authorities.  
Moving on to the subject of societies, the Home Minister has the authority to 
declare a society as being illegal if he so thinks that the purpose of the society is to 
threaten the security of the Federation and cause public disorder as provided in 
Section 5 of the Societies Act 1966 (Revised 1987) (Act 335). For example, the 
formation of the al-Arqam community was deemed as illegal following the discovery 
of the teachings of that society contained in the book “Aurad Muhammadiah 
Pegangan Darul Arqam,” in a fatwa issued by the Muzakarah Fatwa Committee, 
Religious Affairs Council in 1986. By the year 1988, all of the state fatwa committees 
had issued fatwas condemning and outlawing this book. Later, in the same year, the 
Home Ministry also deemed the book to be illegal (Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 
2005). 
Article 8 of the Federal Constitution concerns the right to equality before the 
law without discrimination due to differing religions and creeds. However, the 
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exception to this provision is found in clause (3) that states that this right does not 
apply to personal laws and any other provision that limits promotion or employment 
due to matters relating to religion. Therefore, based on the aforementioned provision, 
the actions of a Muslim who enters a polygamous marriage will not be tried for the 
offence of bigamy. Similarly, the hiring of all-Muslim employees in any state 
religious department cannot be regarded as an act of discrimination. The guarantee 
of no discrimination on the basis of religion, creed, or place of birth in the 
administration of any education foundation and of providing financial aid to any 
institution of learning, whether public or private, is stated in Article 12 of the Federal 
Constitution. However, taking into consideration the status of Islam as the religion 
of the Federation, Article 12(2) explains that the actions of the Federal government 
or a state government to form or maintain Islamic institutions or assist in Islamic 
teachings and provide financial aid is not presumed to be in opposition to the Article 
12. 
Articles 12 (3) and (4) of the Federal Constitution also stress on the age limit 
of a person to enable him to convert to another religion, which is eighteen years of 
age if he doesn’t have the permission of his parents or guardian. This was decided by 
the Supreme Court Judge in the cases of Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadi of Pasir Mas & Anor 
((1990) 2 Malayan Law Journal, 300) , Hun Mun Meng v. Negeri Sembilan Islamic 
Religious Council ((1982)  2 Malayan Law Journal, 676). In the case of religious 
conversion for someone below 18 years, such as in the case of a child who has 
embraced Islam, whenever there is a change regarding their Islamic status, 
permission from the parents or guardian is required to verify the conversion, such as 
in the case of Nedunchelian a/l V. Uthiradam v. Nurshafiqah Binti Mah Singai Annal 
@ Valarmathy a/p Mah Singai Annal & Ors ((2005) 2 All Malayan Report, 711). If 
they do not give their permission, it means that the conversion is unofficial. 
Furthermore, in cases where it’s just the mother or the father who converts to Islam, 
their children who are of eighteen years of age or below will automatically follow 
the new religion of his or her mother or father i.e. Islam as in the case of  Viswalingam 
v. Viswalingam, ((1988) 1 Malayan Law Journal, 300). However, in the recent case 
of Shamala Sathiyaseelan v. Dr Jayaranesh C. Mogarajah & Anor ((2004) 2 
Malayan Law Journal, 648) it was decided that the child will not automatically be 
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converted to Islam even if his or her parents have done so. In this particular case, the 
defendant embraced Islam on 19 November 2002 and both the defendant’s children 
who were aged 3 and 1 years old respectively were registered as Muslims by the 
defendant on 25 November 2002. In addition, in another recent case (Indira Ghandi 
a/p Mutho lwn. Pengajar Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors [2013] 5 Malayan Law 
Journal, 555), it was decided that any child who has either one of his parents convert 
to another religion shall be raised according to the religion of his parents at the time 
he was born. In this case, it was decided that the children were still Hindus until they 
were capable of choosing their own religions.  
C. ACTIONS / CONDUCT THAT AMOUNTS TO APOSTASY IN MALAYSIA 
Based on the reported cases, there are numerous ways and means used by 
individuals to prove that they have renounced Islam, such as by making an admission 
of conversion from Islam accompanied by a Deed Poll or Statutory Declaration 
announcing the renunciation, followed by changing their name to a non-Muslim 
name at the National Registration Department (NRD). In cases of reconversion, an 
individual may prove his renunciation of Islam by practicing the teachings of his 
former religion or indulging in a non-Muslim lifestyle; he may also make a 
confession that he had never believed or practiced the teachings of Islam and so on. 
In short, such individuals will resort to speech, actions or written confessions – 
anything to show their intention to renounce Islam. These actions of apostasy may 
also occur as a group if an individual participates and practices teachings that have 
been legally ruled via fatwa as opposed to Islam; for example, the teachings of 
Qadiyani, Ayah Pin, Rasul Melayu, and many others that mislead people away from 
aqidah Islam. Apostasy has also been reported to occur among youth occultists who 
worship the devil and join certain groups such as Jangan Ikut Tuhan (JIT) (Zainur 
Rijal Abu Bakar, 2012). 
The act of declaring ones’ renunciation of Islam is akin to the act of a new 
convert to Islam who has yet to change his or her original name to a Muslim one. 
They have only declared themselves to have renounced Islam or become apostates. 
The action of maintaining a non-Muslim name (in the case of converts to Islam) may 
be related to issues such as inheritance or reconversion. Apostates have also been 
known to acquire the services of a lawyer to confirm their apostasy, up to and 
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including announcing it in local newspapers, such as what took place in the case of 
Islamic Religious Council v. Hun Mun Meng ((1922) 2 Malayan Law Journal, 676). 
In this case, the defendant had made a statement at a press conference regarding his 
intention to renounce Islam and reconvert to his original religion, Buddhism. Another 
case example is that of Kamariah Ali v. the Government of Kelantan ([2004] 3 
Current Law Journal, 409), where the apostates signed two letters of declaration 
dated 24 August 1998 and 28 August 1998, stating that they had willingly and 
voluntarily renounced Islam. Other cases in which new brothers and sisters in Islam 
declared themselves to be apostates via an application to renounce Islam through a 
Deed Poll in High Court are, to name a few, Soon Singh v. Malaysia Islamic Welfare 
Organisation (PERKIM) Kedah and others ((1994) 1 Malayan Law Journal,  670), 
Md Hakim Lee v. Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council ((1998) 1 Malayan 
Law Journal,  681) and Lim Chan Seng v. Director of Penang Islamic Religious 
Department & others ((1996) 3 Current Law Journal, 231).  
Another step taken by apostates to renounce Islam is by requesting a name-
change (from Malay to non-Malay) at the National Registration Department; such 
examples are from ‘Johan’ to ‘John’, ‘Aliza’ to ‘Elizabeth’, and so on. One such 
actual case was that of Lina Joy ([2007] 3 Current Law Journal, 557)   who had 
requested that her name be changed from Azlina Jailani to Lina Joy. However, her 
attempt at removing the status of her religion as “Islam” on her identity card was 
unsuccessful because her application failed to produce a declaration from the Shariah 
Court regarding her renouncement of Islam. In cases of name-changes such as this 
one, it must be noted that the actual role of the National Registration Department is 
to approve of the process of adding to the name already printed on the identity card 
of the applicant with an ‘alias’ (for example: Aini @ Ann), and is not in any way 
involved in the process of changing the status of his religion. However, individuals 
who have wished to completely rid themselves of their original Muslim identities 
have produced summons in civil courts supported by a letter from a Commissioner 
of Oaths or a Deed Poll from a church or other religious groups. The National 
Registration Department will then approve of the now-complete application based on 
a court order (Zuliza Mohd Kusrin, 1999). Yet another argument used by would-be 
apostates who have attempted to validate their apostasy is the assumption that they 
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too possess the right to freedom of religion and to practice as they wish, as is the case 
for religions other than Islam. For example, in the case of Md. Hakim Lee v. Federal 
Territory Islamic Religious Council, Kuala Lumpur ((1998) 1 Malayan Law Journal, 
681), the respondent claimed that his action in renouncing Islam and reconverting to 
his original religion is parallel with the concept of freedom of religion as guaranteed 
in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution, and that no one, including the Federal 
Territory Islamic Council, had the power to exercise that right. However, the Kuala 
Lumpur High Court decided that only the Shariah Court possessed the jurisdiction to 
determine whether a person is an apostate or otherwise.  
There have also been cases of Muslims cohabiting with non-Muslims to the 
point where their relationship has produced offspring; these individuals also practice 
the teachings of religions other than Islam that veer away from aqidah. One such case 
example of a case is that of Priyathaseny & Ors v. Religious Enforcement Officer of 
Perak Islamic Religious Affairs Department & Ors ( [2003] 2 Current Law Journal, 
221). The first plaintiff in this case was a Muslim who had renounced Islam and was 
at the time a practicing Hindu. She had married the second plaintiff, a man of Indian 
ethnicity and a Hindu himself. As a result of their marriage, they produced two 
children. The first plaintiff was arrested and charged with a number of offences under 
the Perak Islamic Law Administration Enactment 1992, convicted and fined.  
In another case, Wong Chun Chiak @ Kenny Abdullah v. Federal Territory 
Religious Affairs Council, the Syariah High Court set aside the plaintiff’s application 
to renounce Islam. In this case, Kenny, a new brother in Islam, filed an application 
to renounce Islam so that he could marry a non-Muslim and reconvert to his original 
faith, Catholicism  (31 August 2006). Similarly, in the case of Majlis Agama Islam 
Pulau Pinang v. Siti Fatimah Tan Bt Abdullah (Jurnal Hukum 27, Part II, 1430, 192), 
the plaintiff confessed that she had never believed in Islam and that she had been 
praying according to Buddhist rites and rituals as she had before her conversion, even 
though she had converted to Islam and even married a Muslim man. Pertra Pek 
Chong Le @ Nur Shafiqah v. Director of Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak & Ors 
[2014] 3 Shl. R, 32, the plaintiff has converted to the Islamic faith in June 2003 when 
she married a Muslim man, and the registration was done by the Registration 
Department of Sabah. Her identity card issued by the National Registration 
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Department contained her new Muslim’s name and religion. The plaintiff then 
claimed to have been abandoned by her Muslim husband and she had since, not only 
returned to her Christian faith but also married a Nigerian man in Singapore and had 
a daughter born out of wedlock with him. The plaintiff had applied to change her 
Muslim name and religion in her identity card but was rejected by the third defendant.  
The act of ‘informally’ renouncing Islam, i.e. without any form of 
documentation to validate the status of the apostate or a declaration in a Shariah 
Court, has often caused a ‘tug-of-war’ between the deceased informal apostate’s non-
Muslim kin and the State Islamic Religious Council. For example, in the case of Ng 
Wan Chan v Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (No 2) [1991] 3 MLJ 487,the 
Muslim at the time of his death, and had a copy of his certified application to embrace 
the Islamic faith which he had made on 24 December 1973. The conversion-to-Islam 
ceremony was said to have been conducted by one Haji Adam KC Chao, but no 
evidence was forwarded regarding the date and place of the ceremony, nor was there 
any proof that Haji Adam KC Chao was an ‘officer’ as mentioned in the application 
form. Despite it being mentioned that the ceremony was held on 24 December 1973, 
the report on the ceremony was only received two months later by the Islamic 
Religious Council, which was on 2 February 1974. Conversely, the plaintiff had 
evidence to show that the deceased had continued to live with her as a practicing 
Buddhist right up to the day he died. The main question that arose in this case was:  
1. Whether or not the deceased, a Buddhist, had wholly and unquestionably 
converted to Islam in the year 1973;  
2. Whether or not the deceased was a practicing Muslim at the time of his death; 
and 
3. If the deceased had wholly converted to Islam, whether or not he had renounced 
it and turned apostate before he died.  
In this case, the court had allowed the plaintiff’s application on the basis of the 
lack of evidence to show the deceased’s conversion to Islam was made according to 
the requirements of Islamic law. Furthermore, the actions of the deceased during his 
life clearly show that his way of life was not that of one who could be reasonably 
expected to be a Muslim. In situations such as this where there is still a possibility 
that the deceased had converted to Islam for all intents and purposes during his 
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lifetime, the onus is on the Islamic Religious Council to present evidence proving 
that, despite that the deceased did not live his life in the way of a Muslim and that he 
was an apostate, he had repented (taubat) for his sins before his death. In this case, 
there was no such evidence to present, thus causing the court to decide that a 
declaration should have been made stating that the deceased was a Buddhist, both 
during his lifetime and at the time of his death.  
In the case of Nyonya Tahir or Ex-Parte Application of Islamic Religious 
Council of the State of Negeri Sembilan and 2 others (2 Jurnal Hukum xxi/ii, 2006) 
Whatever the efforts made to renounce Islam, only the Shariah Court has the 
jurisdiction to decide and to declare whether a person has become an apostate or 
otherwise, as determined in the previous cases. It is also clear that, for Muslims, the 
act of renouncing Islam is not an absolute right to choose or to change religions, but 
is on the contrary regarded as a sin and a punishable offence (Zainur Rijal Abu Bakar, 
2012). Therefore, the deed of changing religions cannot be performed directly, unlike 
a non-Muslim who wishes to embrace Islam, where the latter may do so openly and 
without legal constraints; nor will he punished by the Shariah Court for doing so, 
unless he is declared to be an apostate by the Shariah Court. Furthermore, if a person 
has the intention of renouncing Islam, they must first undergo detention at an Aqidah 
Rehabilitation Centre, and they will be fined if they still intend to renounce Islam 
post-rehabilitation. Section 66 of the Shariah Criminal Offences (State of Malacca) 
Enactment 1991 regarding Attempted Apostasy:  
1. In the event that a Muslim purposely admits to his intention to renounce Islam 
or declare himself a non-Muslim, either with actions or words or by any means 
necessary, the Court must, if it is satisfied that the individual has committed an 
act that may be interpreted as an attempt to change his iktikad and belief in Islam 
through his own confession or conduct, order that individual to be detained at an 
Islamic Guidance Centre for a period of not more than six months for the purpose 
of education, and that person will be requested to repent according to Islamic 
requirements.  
2. If a person who has been ordered to be detained under subsection (1) - (a) repent 
immediately, the Court shall, after certifying his repentance, release him from 
detention; or (b) if that person repents at any time during his detention, the 
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Guardian Officer must report the matter to the Court, and the Court shall 
summon that person, whereby after verifying his repentance, shall give an order 
for his release.  
3. The Guardian Officer must provide a weekly progress report relating to the 
person in detention to the Court.  
4. The Islamic Rehabilitation Centre must be gazetted as a Detention Centre in the 
Gazette.  
It is thus clear that the special position of Islam as the official religion of the 
Federation indirectly imposes certain restrictions on individuals who intend to 
renounce Islam, in order to preserve the sanctity of the religion. This therefore 
clarifies the existence of a relation between the special status of Islam and the 
conditional right to apostasy.  
In the case of Kamariah Ali v. the State of Kelantan [2002] 3 Current Law 
Journal, 766), Abdul Hamid Mohamad HMR stated: 
“…if the meaning of Article 11 of the Federal Constitution is to allow one the 
freedom to enter and leave a religion with impunity and no law requires him to follow 
certain rules on whether to embrace or renounce a religion.  Effectively not only the 
laws prescribe the manner for a person to embrace Islam and renounce Islam is 
illegal, but the law that makes it an offense for a Muslim to commit adultery, close 
proximity, not paying tithes and act illegal, too. Therefore, I am of the view that, any 
specific matter relating to the religion of Islam, Article11 of the Federal Constitution 
cannot be too widely interpreted. To the extent, it will nullify all the laws requiring 
a Muslim to perform a certain obligation in Islam or prohibit something that is against 
by Islam or stipulating any event relating to Islam.” 
D. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ON RENOUNCING ISLAM 
There are two implications and effects on renouncing Islam - its effects on the 
person renouncing Islam and the jurisdiction of the rightful court to hear the cases. 
1. Legal Implications on The Applicants 
In the issue of application of renouncing Islam the submission is supposed 
to be submitted to the Shariah Court, even though there have been cases of 
applications submitted to the Civil Court. Where upon review, the Civil Court, 
following the procedures will accord the Shariah Court the jurisdiction to hear 
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those cases. The act of renouncing Islam, either through official application to 
the Shariah Court, or unofficially i.e. without going through the Shariah Court, 
both of which have important legal implications. For a case of making the 
application to the Shariah High Court, the application will be heard and when 
the court is satisfied, the applicant will be declared as renouncing Islam. The 
effect is that, the applicant is liable to a sentence, subject to the provisions of the 
States’ Shariah Criminal Offences Enactment. In Kelantan and Terengganu, the 
punishment is according to the Hudud law. However, the Hudud law sentence is 
not enforceable due to constraints of the Shariah Court's jurisdiction, which is 
inferior to the punishment of apostasy offense. Existing penalties for apostasy 
offences are in the form of fines and remands. The existence of legal provisions 
on renouncing Islam directly proves that the act is against the laws in Malaysia. 
It is necessary to distinguish the cases of an invalid conversion into Islam, which 
the Shariah Courts also have jurisdiction to decide, as in the case of Fatimah Tan 
or Islamic Religious Council of the State of Penang v. Siti Fatimah Tan Bt 
Abdullah,  (Jurnal Hukum 27, Part II , 1430,. 192). In the case of Fatimah Tan, 
the court held that the conversion to Islam of Fatimah Tan was invalid even 
though her conversion was registered. This was because Fatimah had never 
admitted or believed in Islam as her new religion and her Islamic conversion 
registration procedure was merely to enable her to marry a Muslim man. 
According to the State Islamic Law Administration Enactment in 
Malaysia, a person who converts to Islam is subject to the Islamic law, known 
as new converts, the Personal/Family law of the Civil Laws switches to Islamic 
Laws. Nevertheless, this does not mean annulments of previous marriages. It 
only qualifies one to be married (to a Muslim), even though the civil marriage is 
still valid. This is to prevent him/her from being prosecuted for bigamy offences, 
because civil marriages and any customary marriage is subject to sections 4 and 
8 of the Civil Law / Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (Zuliza Mohd 
Kusrin, 2006). 
The next effect is the legality on the action of renouncing Islam, which is 
misconstrued as providing a legal way out of Islam. However, an observation 
made on the provision clearly shows that it only briefly outlines procedures for 
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those who intend to leave Islam, and who is adamant to leave Islam, to follow 
these procedures as an administrative control to certify cases of apostasy or 
renouncing Islam in Negeri Sembilan. The provision regarding the declaration 
of renouncing Islam in Negeri Sembilan clearly gives rooms to the court to 
ascertain that the applicant had not wanted to repent before the declaration of his 
religious status is announced. The grace period given by the court is to give 
ample time to the applicant to do profound thinking about the matter (Zulkifli 
Hasan and Norfadhilah Mohd Ali, 2007). Although such provision is not 
explicitly stated in other States’ Islamic Law Administration Enactment, in terms 
of administration, all the states will follow the same course of actions – advice, 
remand and fines in dealing with cases of apostasy, as stated in Section 119 of 
the Religious Administration of Negeri Sembilan.  
a. A Muslim can not renounce Islam or be deemed to have left Islam as his 
religion unless and until he has obtained a declaration for that purpose from 
the Syariah High Court. 
b. An ex parte application for a declaration under subsection (1) shall submit 
it to the Syariah High Court judge, in an open court by the person who 
wishes to leave Islam as his religion. 
c. An application under subsection (2) shall state the grounds upon which the 
applicant wishes to leave Islam as a religion and must be supported by an 
affidavit stating all the facts supporting the grounds of the application. 
d. Upon receipt of an application under subsection (2), the Syariah High Court 
judge who hears the application shall — 
1) advise the person to repent, and if the Judge is satisfied that person has 
repented according to the Syariah law, shall make records of that 
person’s repentant; or 
2) if the person refuses to repent, before making any order against the 
person, adjourn the hearing of the application for a period of 90 days and 
at the same time require the applicant to undergo counseling and 
guidance sessions for the purpose of advising the applicant to reconsider 
Islam as his religion. 
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e. If at any time, the person required to undergo counseling and guidance 
sessions have repented, the officer in charge shall immediately prepare a 
report and bring the person before the Syariah High Court. 
f. If the Judge is satisfied that the person brought before him under subsection 
(5) has repented according to the Syariah law, the Judge shall record the 
repentant. 
g. If on the expiration of 90 days referred to in paragraph (4)(b), that person 
still refuses to repent, then the officer responsible for it shall immediately 
prepare a report and bring the person before the Syariah High Court. 
h. If, after receipt of the report referred to in subsection (7), the Court considers 
that there is still hope for him to repent, the Court may adjourn the hearing 
of the application under subsection (2) and at the same time order the person 
to undergo a counseling session and further guidance for a period not 
exceeding one year. 
i. If after an order under subsection (8) is made, the person repents, subsection 
(5) and (6) applies. 
j. If after expiration of the period ordered under subsection (8) and the person 
still refuses to repent, the officer responsible for it shall prepare a report and 
bring the person before the Syariah High Court and the Court may decide to 
declare that person has relinquish his faith of Islam into apostasy. 
In the case of Lina Joy, the manner of a person in renouncing a religion 
must follow a prescribed approach, the laws and practices of the religion. 
Meanwhile, an appellant is not prevented from entering into a marriage. 
However, the freedom of religion under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution 
requires an appellant to comply with the practices or the Islamic laws particularly 
on a conversion out of a religion. Only when the provisions are in compliances 
with the Islamic laws and the Islamic religious authorities have certified that an 
applicant has left the religion of Islam, then the appellant may profess 
Christianity. For someone who has left Islam, from the administration aspect, he 
is still subject to the Islamic laws so long as the status as a Muslim is still on his 
identity card. Thus so, they cannot solemnize and register a civil marriage as 
civil laws do not apply to Muslims. Similarly with property inheritance, they are 
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precluded from bequeathing or giving out inheritance to non-Muslims because a 
non-Muslim cannot inherit from a Muslim. That was a point that Lina Joy had 
championed in the case of Lina Joy v. Federal Territory Islamic Religious 
Council & Others ( [2007] 3Current Law Journal,  557),  where the appellant 
who was originally a Muslim, left Islam and converted to Christianity. On 
January 8, 1997, the appellant applied to the National Registration Department 
(NRD) to change the name Azlina Bt. Jailani as stated in her identity card (IC) 
to Lina Lelani on the ground, as shown in her statutory declaration that she had 
converted to Christianity and wished to marry a Christian man. The NRD 
rejected the appellant's application. On March 15, 1999, the appellant once again 
applied to change her name on the same ground, but this time to Lina Joy. 
However, for this second application, on the advice of an NRD officer, the 
appellant made an additional statutory declaration in which the reason for the 
name change was deliberate and not because due to change of religion. The 
appellant's application was approved by the NRD, and in November 1999 the 
appellant was given her new IC (her formal application for a new IC was made 
on October 25, 1999). However, the new IC still bears the word "Islam" as her 
religious status. 
Based on the case of Lina Joy, the Shariah Court's decision is vital to 
support any application for the removal of the status Islam from a person’s IC. 
Even though, a person whether purposely by verbal, action or confession clearly 
indicates his conversion out of Islam, confirmation from the Shariah Court is 
required. The NRD has no authority to treat cases of removing the status of Islam 
from any person’s IC unless it has received a verified confirmation from the 
Shariah Court of that person’s apostasy. The NRD can only entertain 
applications to change the names on the identity card from the name of a Muslim 
to a non-Muslim, such as Azlina Jailani to Lina Joy. This was proved once again 
when the appellant (Lina Joy v. Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council & 
Others (Jurnal Hukum 24/1. 1428H. 61)) submitted an application to remove the 
word "Islam" from the religious status. The judge who heard the case once again 
stressed that the application would only be considered if it was verified by a  
Shariah Court order stating that appellant was indeed an apostate, and on that 
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ground had directed that an order or such certificate to be submitted to him. His 
directive was not complied with and consequently the Director General of the 
NRD rejected the appellant's application based on provision r. 14 Rules 1990. 
These rules require the appellant to submit documentary evidence supporting the 
accuracy of her contention that she was no longer a Muslim. The Court of Appeal 
stated that the question of whether or not a person was no longer a Muslim was 
a question related to the Islamic laws. Therefore, as NRD was not qualified to 
decide on the matter, and to avoid risk of wrongly deleting the word "Islam", it 
was only fair and reasonable for NRD to adopt a policy that required a 
confirmation from the religious authorities before going ahead with the decision 
to delete the word "Islam" from a Muslim’s identity card. 
In the aspect of death when it occurs, the issue raised was the tussle over 
the remains of the deceased whether to be buried according to Muslim rites, or 
otherwise. The matter that needs to be resolved is the determination of the 
religious status of the deceased before the commencement of the funeral rites. 
Which courts has the jurisdiction? In the case of Kaliammal Sinnasamy v. 
Director of the Federal Territory Islamic Religious Department   ([2006] 1 
Current Law Journal, 753), there was a tussle over Moorthy’s remains between 
the Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council and the family of the deceased. 
The deceased’s wife had filed an application in the Civil Court to review the 
decision of the Shariah Court that the deceased was a Muslim on his passing. In 
this case, the deceased was a convert registered with JAWI, and his identity card 
had shown Islam as his religious status. However, after his death, his wife, 
through her application to the Civil High Court of Kuala Lumpur, demanded for 
a Hindu customary burial on the ground that the deceased was a Hindu and had 
practiced Hindu religious customs and rites at all time. High Court Judge in this 
case decided as follows: 
“I’m also of the opinion that even if the applicant through her affidavit 
attempted to show that the deceased took part in Hindu religious ceremonies. Or 
did things contrary to Islam, or did not perform things that should be done by a 
Muslim during the stated period of his conversion to Islam, it is once again, for 
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the Syariah Court to determine such matters because it remains under its 
jurisdiction”.  
The case of Nyonya Tahir or Ex-Parte Application of Islamic Religious 
Council of the State of Negeri Sembilan and 2 others,( 2 Jurnal Hukum xxi/ii, 
2006)  is also similar to the Moorthy’s case in the sense that a Muslim religious 
status was on her identity card. However, this was an easy case to solve because 
the subpoenaed victim's family had attended the Shariah Court hearing and to 
testify in the Shariah Court. The Shariah Court decided based on strong 
evidences that the deceased was a Buddhist at her death, although the status of 
her religion of Islam was on her identity card. The Shariah High Court had 
decided to hand over Nyonya Tahir’s remains to her beneficiaries for burial 
according to Buddhist rites due to the decision that she was not a Muslim on her 
passing. This was the decision made by Judge Mohd Shukor Sabudin after 
hearing an ex parte application of Islamic declaration submitted by the Negeri 
Sembilan Islamic Religious Council (MAINS), Negeri Sembilan Department of 
Islamic Affairs (JHEAINS) and JHEAINS’s Director. This was also decided 
based on the affidavit submitted by Nyonya’s youngest son, Chiang Ah Fatt 
together with a joint testimony with his sister, Chiang Kwang Ying, 43, in court. 
The problem arised when a family refused to attend a Shariah Court 
hearing to give evidence on the ground that they were non-Muslims, as in the 
case of Rayappan. However, section 83 of the Shariah Court Evidence 
(Selangor) Enactment 2003 clearly states that "A non-Muslim is competent to 
vouch (bayyinah) for Muslims if the evidence is admissible according to the 
Syariah law". Therefore, it is a non-issue for a non-Muslim not to testify in a 
Shariah Court. 
In determining the religious status of the deceased, there is a Civil Court 
intervention in the dispute of determining the status of religion of a person. For 
example, in the case of Moorthy ( [2006] 1 Current Law Journal 753)  and 
Rayappan, the family of the deceased who were not satisfied with the decision 
of the Shariah Court had made a claim in a Civil Court to obtain a declaration 
that the deceased was not a Muslim at his death. This at once raised a redundancy 
in the jurisdiction   i.e. in   determining which court’s jurisdiction to hear such 
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dispute that involves religion. In the case of   Rayyapan, uproar broke out in the 
mortuary of Kuala Lumpur Hospital (HKL) over disagreement between the 
Selangor Islamic Religious Council (MAIS) and Rayappan’s family where 
Rayappan had allegedly converted to Islam but it was claimed that he had 
returned to his original religion of Christianity in 1999 (Florance A. Samy, 
2012).The dispute involved the issue of whether Rayappan’s burial ceremony 
was in accordance to the Islamic or Christian rites after he died on November 29 
2006, due to diabetes and breathing difficulties. However, on Dec 7 2006, MAIS 
decided to withdraw the claim on Rayappan’s remains due to lack of new 
evidence that could support the claims and the Shariah High Court had granted 
MAIS’s application to withdraw their claims. Following that, Rayappan’s 
remain was cremated at a cremation centre and was given a proper Christian 
burial (Florance A. Samy, 2012). 
Finally, in the case of Amir Gan (Ex Parte Application of The Islamic 
Religious Council of Negeri Sembilan ( Civil case no. 05100- 099-0037-2008)) 
, the Shariah High Court declared that a man, Gan Eng Gor or Amir Gan, 74 
years was a Muslim. The Sharie Judge, Mohd. Nadzri Abdul Rahman, had made 
the order directing the parties in charge of Amir’s remains to hand the remains 
over to the applicant for an immediate proper burial according to Islam and the 
Shariah law. The Court issued a directive allowing an ex-parte application by the 
Negeri Sembilan Islamic Religious Council (MAINS), Negeri Sembilan Islamic 
Religious Department (JAINS), the Registrar of Converts and one of Amir's 
sons, Abdul Rahman Gan, 47 years. Mohd Nadzri made the decision after 
hearing an ex parte application filed for an order that Amir was a Muslim. The 
affidavit stated that Amir, though incapacitated on his death bed, was sane and 
sober and had nodded his head when asked if he wanted to convert to Islam. 
2. Legal Implications Against Jurisdiction Of The Courts  
In the context of religious freedom in Malaysia, the jurisdictional conflict 
between the Shariah and Civil Courts is mainly in deciding the rightful court to 
hear cases of apostasy. Question that is often in dispute is whether the case of 
apostasy falls under jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. What is the legal 
justification of allowing the Court to hear such cases? To clarify those questions, 
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several High Court decisions need to be given due consideration and attention. 
In the case of Ng Wan Chan v. Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council (No. 
2) [1991] 3 Malayan Law Journal, 487) and Lim Chan Seng v. Director of the 
Islamic Religious Department ([1996] 3 Current Law Journal, 231), it was 
clearly decided that without clear jurisdiction granted to the Shariah Court on 
such matter, the Civil Court shall retain its jurisdiction over the matter. Then the 
case of Md. Hakim Lee v. the Religious Council ([1998]   Current Law Journal, 
681), the question before him was the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court under 
Article 121 (1A) of the Constitution. He acknowledged that no specific provision 
in Kedah Enactment relating to jurisdiction of the Shariah Court in addressing 
the issue of apostasy. However,  taking into consideration of item 1, List 2 of the 
Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution, to be read together with the case of 
Daliph Kaur ( [1991] 3 Current Law Journal, 2768) , which   referred to apostasy 
issue as under the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. It also had to take into 
consideration "Craises on Statute Law" and the case of Albon v. Pyke in which 
Tindal J. which also used the word "necessary implication"– hence, the Federal 
Court concluded that it was in line with the logic for the Syariah Court, given 
clear indication of its jurisdiction to adjudicate matters relating to the conversion 
into Islam, by implications necessary, had the jurisdiction to adjudicate matter 
associated with a Muslim renouncing the religion of Islam, thus setting aside the 
Civil Courts jurisdiction over such matters. The verdict of this case set the 
precedence over the case of Tongiah Jumali & Ors v.The StateGovernment of 
Johor & Ors [2003] 2 Current Law Journal, 280 , where  the Syariah Court has 
the jurisdiction to hear an application concerning conversion out of  Islam 
whenever the relevant state enactment contains provisions regarding conversion 
into Islam.  
In addition, Act 505 contains provisions on matters relating to conversion 
to Islam that fall under the jurisdiction of the Federal Territory Syariah Court 
(ss. 87 and 91 to be read together with s. 46(2)(b) of the Act). Thus, by 
implication, the matters of apostasy or renouncing Islam also fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. 
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 In the case of Dalip Kaur vs. District Police Officer, the District Police of 
Bukit Mertajam & Anor ([1991] 3 Current Law Journal, 2768); that the answer 
to the question of whether a person is a Muslim or a convert out of Islam before 
he died is included in the spectrum of the Shariah laws that requires serious 
considerations and appropriate interpretation of the laws. Finally, in the case of 
Kamariah Ali  ([2004] 3 Current Law Journal, 409); Ahmad Fairuz,  Federal 
Court Judge, which has taken the purposive approach in determining the real 
time of whether the appellants were Muslims while committing an offense under 
the Kelantan Council of Religion and Malay Custom Enactment 1966. In this 
case, although the appellants had declared their apostasy in 1988, they were still 
subject to the Islamic law and were compelled, in year 2000, for those cases to 
be brought to the Shariah Court because the prosecution was in respect of an 
offense that was committed while the appellants were still Muslims. By ignoring 
this purposive approach, the Muslims facing charges in the Shariah Court could, 
with impunity, raise the defense of no longer professing Islamic faith. 
E. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE SYARIAH COURT IN CASES OF 
CONVERSION OUT OF ISLAM 
There had been discussions regarding issues of jurisdictional conflicts between 
the Shariah court and the civil court and finally Article 121 (1A) amended to resolve 
these issues. A new clause (1A) amended by Act 704 of 1988, effective January 10, 
1988, has revoked the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of matters falling 
within jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. This article provides from January 10, 1988 
that, the High Court in Malaya and Borneo shall have no jurisdiction in respect of 
any matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court as defined in the 
Ninth Schedule. List II – the State List of the Constitution states that it has 
jurisdiction in respect of the Islamic Law and Personal status and the Family Law of 
person professing the religion of Islam (Ahmad Ibrahim, 2 Malayan Law Journal, 
xvii). In the case of Md. Hakim Lee v. Federal Territory Islamic Religious Council, 
Kuala Lumpur ([1997] 4 Current Law Journal, 419), pertaining to the same issue, 
Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J (at that time) had decided: 
“This matter of the plaintiff which involves the determination of his status upon 
his purported renunciation of the Islamic faith by the deed poll and the statutory 
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declaration is outside the jurisdiction of this court to determine, on account of the 
ouster of the jurisdiction by art 121 (1A) of the Federal Constitution. By virtue of 
para 1 in List 11 of the Ninth Schedule to the Federal Constitution, the jurisdiction 
lies with the syariah court on its wider jurisdiction over a person professing the 
religion of Islam even if no express provisions are provided in the Administration of 
Islam Law (Federal Territories) Act 1993 ("the Act") because under art 74 of the 
Constitution, it is within the competency of the legislative to legislate on the matter. 
It’s absent from the express provision in Act would not confirm the jurisdiction in 
the civil court. To my mind, the language of art 121(1A) used by the legislative is 
clear and without any ambiguity. The civil courts, in this case, the High Court, has 
no jurisdiction in respect of any matter that is within the jurisdiction of the syariah 
court”. 
Based on the results of previous cases clearly show that the Shariah Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases related to Islamic affairs as provided in List II of 
the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. The Judge in the case of Zubeydah 
bt Shaikh Mohd v. Kalaichelvan a/l Alagapan and others ([2003] 2 Malayan Law 
Journal 471)   had concluded that: 
(i) Civil Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether a 
Muslim has renounced his faith in Islam or into apostasy. It is under the 
jurisdiction of the Syariah Court. This is so because the question of whether a Muslim 
has renounced his faith in Islam or into apostasy is a serious issue that only the 
qualified experts in the field of Islamic law could determine. 
(ii) A person who declares that he has converted out of Islam should seek 
confirmation from the Syariah Court. A declaration or profession of apostasy through 
a letter is not sufficient to confirm of his apostasy or otherwise.  
Court of Appeal in the case of Lina Joy v. Federal Territory Islamic Religious 
Council & Ors ( [2005] 4 Current Law Journal, 666), among others had decided that 
anyone who wanted to leave Islam is required to do so through the Islamic religious 
authorities. Abdul Aziz Mohamed JCA had stated: 
“One might be tempted to think that the fact a person affirms in a statutory 
declaration that he is no longer a Muslim, or the fact the he has been participating in 
a Christian form of worship. Alternatively, the fact that he is been baptized is 
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sufficient according the to Islamic Law to warrant others to consider him as having 
been apostatized and   as being no longer a Muslim. However, is that so in the Islamic 
Law? It may be that according to the Islamic Law that no Muslim may be treated as 
having apostatized, no matter what he may have done or fail to do, unless and until 
he has been declared an apostate by some proper authority.” 
The power is within the jurisdiction of the Shariah Court. Based on the verdicts 
of those cases clearly show that a person who renounces the faith of Islam should be 
first be heard in the Syariah Court to ascertain of his or her profession of apostasy. 
Thus, the forum or qualified and skilled body to decide is the Syariah Court. That 
should be the course of action in the matter of determination of the religion of the 
deceased as is similar to the case of Ng Wan Chan, Daliph Kaur and Nyonya Tahir. 
In the case of Daliph Kaur v. District Police Officer, the District Police of Bukit 
Mertajam & Anor (1992] 1 Malayan Law Journal, 7), stated as follows: 
“It is apparent from the observation made by the learned judicial commissioner 
that the determination of the question whether a person was a Muslim or had 
renounced the faith of Islam before death, transgressed into the realm of Syariah Law 
which needs serious considerations and proper interpretation of such law. Without 
proper authority to support his contention, it is not sufficient to say whether there is 
not a condition precedent for a person to become a Muslim; or that if the deceased 
were proved at a Sikh temple he was definitely an apostate.” 
F. CONCLUSION 
Freedom of Religion in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution is not subject to 
Muslims as a Muslim who converts out of Islam is subject to legal actions. However, 
this provision is incapable in preventing a conversion of a Muslim out of Islam as 
evidenced by many who have professed their intention to leave Islam through 
declarations of apostasy, change of names through the National Registration 
Department, practicing non-Muslim religions such as performing prayers at temples, 
married to a Hindu at a Hindu temple and many more. However, these actions do not 
automatically confirm their profession out of Islam, for Article 121 (1A) of the 
Shariah Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a person remains a 
Muslim or an apostate. The punishments, in the form of reminders, warnings, years 
of solitary at rehabilitation centers and fines, clearly show that apostasy is an offense, 
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albeit the fundamental right defined in Article 11 of the Federal Constitution. There 
are several legal implications toward the renouncement of Islam either made 
officially or unofficially. The act of unofficial or informal renouncement, i.e. without 
recording it with the Islamic Religious Council and the Shariah Court, raises issues 
of civil marriage registrations, determination of religious status of the deceased, 
inheritance of estates and so on. The authorities need to monitor and enforce the laws 
and legislations so that all actions involving conversion out of Islam have updated 
records of the religious status of parties involved. This is to facilitate administration 
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